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Abstract The dichotomy between intended and unintended outcomes of indi-
vidual and collective action is central to political economy. It concerns the rela-
tionship of markets and states and their link to the constitution of society. As such,
this dichotomy points to the patterns of connectivity that provide the social
embedding of markets and states. The present paper argues that civil society is best
understood as the principal locus of connectivity in which markets and states
operate. Civil society so configured is neither separate from the body politic and
commercial society nor subordinate to them but instead constitutes the primary
objective structure of the social domain. It embeds the causal arrangements that
determine the crisscrossing of both intended and unintended outcomes in specific
contexts. Within the social domain, dispositions of the means-end type interact with
non-instrumental dispositions. One important implication is that civil society is
compatible with a range of different political economies and specific socio-eco-
nomic arrangements. Based on a typology of three distinct paradigms of civil
society, we argue that the proximity paradigm is conducive to the discovery of
political economies that foster greater openness and specificity compared with the
political and the economic paradigm. This paper suggests that the theory of civil
society in general and the proximity paradigm in particular are indispensable
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heuristic tools to identity the unrealized capacities inherent in any given social
configuration. A proximity heuristic is applied to the discussion of credit arrange-
ments and policy. We conclude that a hierarchy of policy principles is necessary to
preserve the primacy of social connectivity over means-end relationships and the
conditions for context-specific arrangements and policy options.
Keywords Political economy  Intended and unintended outcomes  Social
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1 Introduction
A fundamental dichotomy in political economy is the one between goals achieved
by agents directly aiming at them (intended outcomes) and goals achieved through
the actions of agents whose original purpose had been different (unintended
outcomes). Adam Smith’s occasional use of the ‘invisible hand’ metaphor is a case
in point (Smith 1976a [1759], iv.i.10; 1976b [1776], iv.ii.9; Rothschild 1994;
Rothschild 2001; Rothschild and Sen 2006). Another instance is the set of situations
to which the fundamental theorems of welfare economics apply (Arrow 1951;
Chipman 2002). The above dichotomy comes into play when discussing the
relationship between markets and states and the relationship of both to the
constitution of society. For both markets and states are institutional devices
conducive to the attainment of individual or collective goals. At the same time, they
also are channels through which human actions may end up delivering outcomes
partially or completely different from those originally envisaged (Menger 1963
[1883]; Hayek 1973; Vanberg 2005).
The dichotomy between intended and unintended outcomes calls attention to the
complex patterns of connectivity that provide the social embedding of markets and
states and underpin the specific causal structures at work in the economic domain.
The conjecture we want to explore in this paper is that neither markets nor states
derive their distinctive features in specific contexts from the functions or purposes
conventionally assigned to them. In reality, historically and socially defined patterns
of connectivity are central in determining the working of markets and states under
given conditions. Intended and unintended outcomes within certain contexts are best
explained in terms of the causal network in which actions take place, rather than in
terms of one-directional means-ends relationships.1 We contend that the concept of
civil society can be used to describe the primary constitution of connectivity in
1 Here and in what follows we shall denote by causal network the system of causal laws relevant to the
context in view, i.e. a domain in which it is possible for certain actions or interventions to bring about
certain outcomes. By contrast, a causal structure is considered as a system of outcomes resulting from
certain actions or interventions, and this distinction impinges upon the other distinction between ‘strategy
causation’ and ‘production causation’ discussed by Nancy Cartwright (Cartwright 2007, pp. 206–210).
This calls attention to the intertwining of intended and unintended outcomes and highlights that need of
locating both within the causal structure of any given social domain.
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which markets and states operate. Our argument will go further and suggest that
civil society embeds the causal structures determining the relationship between
intended and unintended outcomes in any given social domain. Civil society so
configured rests on the idea that economic and political agents have dispositions to
interact in cooperation or conflict and that it is this type of connectivity which
constitutes the ultimate condition of context-specific congruence in society.
The following section locates the domain of civil society beyond the confines of
markets and states. It also suggests that this domain encompasses the relational
patterns and instrumental connections fundamental to the working of markets and
states. As such, we distance ourselves from many of the dominant conceptions, both
past and present, that view civil society either as an extension of the modern state or
as being synonymous with commercial society, or even as an additional domain
separate from both. The third section outlines the core elements of a theory of civil
society, contrasting the political and the economic paradigm with what we call the
proximity paradigm. The theory outlined in this paper shifts the emphasis away
from the dichotomy of closure and openness (linked to the political and the
economic paradigm) towards the idea (associated with the proximity paradigm) that
multiple levels of connectivity ultimately provide a condition of context-specific
congruence in society. The fourth section focuses on the political economies of civil
society, that is, on those instrumental arrangements of economic and organizational
actions ensuring the provision of goods and services in any given society. To view
civil society as the embedding structure of purpose-driven activities calls attention
to the unintended outcomes of those activities and thus to embedding itself as the
primary locus of congruence, as the proximity paradigm highlights. The fifth section
links the proximity paradigm of civil society to principles of economic policy-
making. In that section we derive some fundamental guidelines and consider the
application of these to the selected area of credit policy. The final section presents
some concluding remarks.
2 Beyond markets and states: the domain of civil society
Much of contemporary academic research and public policy-making views markets
and states as foundational categories that constitute and structure social reality.
However, what remains unexplained is, first of all, why these categories are—or
should be—seen as either naturally or historically given and, secondly, in what type
of sociability those categories are ultimately grounded. The focus of this paper is on
how to bring together markets and states under a common conceptual framework
provided by the interplay of intended and unintended outcomes. The dichotomy
between intended and unintended outcomes calls attention to the patterns of
connectivity that provide the social embedding of markets and states and underpin
the specific causal structures at work in the economic domain.2 We argue that the
2 Our approach contrasts with notions of embeddedness and cognate concepts that are deployed in the
literature such as Mark Granovetter’s distinction between weak and strong ties and Walter Powell’s
network forms of production organization. See Granovetter (1973, 2005) and Powell (1990).
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domain of civil society conceptualises these patterns of connectivity and the
associated causal structures. In virtue of that connectivity, actions may or may not
achieve their intended outcomes, and outcomes resulting from actions aimed by
certain individuals at specific objectives may prove to be conducive to the
realization of different objectives, either of the same individuals or others. Patterns
of connectivity are also responsible for unintended outcomes that may impinge upon
agents’ dispositions and ultimately transform the setting of economic and social
interactions.
In this view, the distinction between instrumental and non-instrumental activities
takes a new turn. For that distinction would no longer derive from different
subjective attitudes (such as selfish versus altruistic dispositions) but from a division
within the objective structure of the domain of civil society. Instrumental activities
are states of the world in which certain practices are directly conducive to achieving
one or more particular ends as a result of explicit goal-seeking, whereas non-
instrumental activities are states of the world that may or may not be conducive to
specific ends independently of explicit goal-seeking. The above distinction suggests
the possibility of identifying non-instrumental conditions by means of a negative
heuristics: for any given context, it is reasonable to expect that there will be
practices associated with social outcomes different from those deliberately
envisaged. Correspondingly, we may expect that there will be social outcomes
removed from any explicit goal-seeking behaviour, even if the same outcomes could
be associated with instrumental dispositions under different circumstances.
This point of view is consistent with Friedrich August von Hayek’s emphasis on
‘‘how the order of rules affects the resulting order of actions’’ (Vanberg 2005, p. 25;
cf. Hayek 1969), even if those are rules ‘‘which the individual may be unable to
express in words’’ (Hayek 1978, p. 7).3 It is also consistent with John Hicks’s
distinction between the order of being and the order of doing (see Scazzieri and
Zamagni 2008, p. 6), in which the former is configured as a causal network that
precedes the activation of specific goal-seeking practices, while the latter is
conceived as a causal structure brought about by practices targeting specific
objectives (but not necessarily successful in achieving their purpose). John
Broome’s recent emphasis on the role of dispositions in disentangling the
ambiguous status of ‘‘acting for a reason’’ (Broome 2009) is an important reminder
of the intertwining of deliberate reasoning and habits of which agents may be
unaware but which may be central in determining the configuration of intended and
unintended outcomes specific to any given social context (see also Drolet and
Suppes 2008). The world of practice is a complex structure of overlaps between
intended and unintended outcomes, and these overlaps are closely associated with
the constitutive role of uncertainty in social life. As Albert Hirschman noted, the
outcomes of certain activities ‘‘are so uncertain’’ that they are ‘‘strongly
3 Important sources of Hayek’s theory are Adam Ferguson’s conjecture that human beings ‘‘stumble
upon’’ institutional devices which nobody has actively designed and implemented (Ferguson 1966,
p. 123; 1st edn 1767), as well as in Carl Menger’s view that ‘‘institutions which serve the common
welfare and are extremely significant for its development come into being without a common will directed
toward establishing them’’ (Menger 1963, p. 146; see also Scazzieri 2003a, pp. 326–332).
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characterized by a certain fusion of (and confusion between) striving and attaining’’
(Hirschman 1985: 13; cf. Hirschman 1982: 84–91).
The concept of civil society may be used to describe precisely the overlap of
intended and unintended outcomes that configures the constitution of any given
social domain in which interactions are not solely instrumental and target-oriented.
Within any such domain, social activity is open to a plurality of possible results, and
uncertainty is partly a product of the criss-crossing of multiple causal linkages. Civil
society so configured suggests a fundamental rethinking of economic and political
theory. Rather than being wedded to the dichotomy between the body politic and
commercial society that are governed primarily by individual rights or private self-
interest, our account views civil society as the principal locus of the dispositions for
co-operation or conflict. As such, it is different from some pre-modern conceptions
of community and civic life. Indeed, it addresses interpretive and policy issues by
highlighting the manifold possibilities that are grounded in the domain of social
practices. By contrast with Hobbesian and Lockean ideas of contractual connections
based on pre-social individual rights and means-ends rationality, our argument starts
with the preliminary consideration of the mutual congruence of dispositions within
any given social structure. We maintain that the domain of civil society (as defined
above) is the space of possible arrangements in which dispositions of the means-
ends type interact with non-instrumental actions and dispositions and thus become
embedded in the causal structure generating both intended and unintended
outcomes. Civil society so configured combines the realization of specific objectives
in the economic and political spheres with the persistence of a durable space of
social connectivity. This complex web of instrumental and non-instrumental social
relationships provides the foundations not only for informal arrangements but also
for formally instituted political and economic life.
In part, our account of civil society is an attempt to respond to the failure
properly to theorise civil society beyond the categories of markets and states. This
does not mean that civil society stands apart from the public or the private sector.
Much rather, the question is whether civil society is a mere artifice derived from
agents’ deliberate decision-making or whether it mirrors an objective ‘order of
things’ (e.g. Hicks’ ‘‘order of being’’, as defined above). In that order, fundamental
structures of interaction are more primary than explicit contractual arrangements,
and social connectivity takes precedence over explicit goal seeking.4 To explore this
critical issue, the following section outlines core elements for a theory of civil
society.
4 This set of ideas is congruent with a wide array of different yet overlapping schools of thought
throughout the modern age, from the Cambridge Platonists and David Hume’s idea of universal sympathy
via Thomas Carlyle to Karl Polanyi. For example Ralph Cudworth emphasizes the role of real relations
among persons and things that precede any contractual arrangements. Such real relations (‘scheses’)
combine horizontal and vertical patterns of interaction (see Cudworth, A Treatise Concerning Eternal and
Immutable Morality, Book IV, chap. II, 4–13, chap. III, 11; Cudworth 1996, pp. 86–96 and 111). In this
connection, David Hume speaks of ‘‘[t]he coherence and apparent sympathy in all the parts of this world’’
(see his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, XII; Hume 1948, p. 86). See also Carlyle (1843) and
Polanyi (2000).
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3 Towards a theory of civil society
This section investigates three principal paradigms of civil society, which draw
attention respectively to the political, economic and proximity dimensions of
sociability and are a useful benchmark for the construction of a more general theory.
There is a close relationship between concepts of sociability and ideas of civil
society. The former denote dispositions of human beings to interact on a regular
basis, to establish relatively endurable webs of relationships, and to use those
relationships in order to further the achievement of oikeiosis, which could
sometimes include the improvement of material welfare.5 Those webs designate a
particular set of relations, institutions and organizations that allow the realization of
sociability by blending horizontal connections with certain vertical arrangements.
This underscores the multiple sources of power in the sense of influence (Wieser
1926) within any given social configuration. Connectivity so configured leads to
social outcomes through objective congruence rather than deliberate decision-
making.
The link between sociability and civil society is to be found in the primary
character of social dispositions, and in the secondary character of the specific
objectives assigned to any given organizational set-up. Civil society is a matrix of
relationships such that dispositions to interact according to congruent patterns take
precedence over specific purpose-oriented arrangements of actions.6 At their root,
modes of interaction embedded in civil society are open to the realization of
outcomes that had not been directly anticipated or sought for (unintended
outcomes): the mutual congruence of dispositions within one or more causal
networks is to a certain extent independent of the tasks human actions perform in a
programmed arrangement of activity. This means that civil society provides a
benchmark for the assessment of how institutional and organizational capacities can
work within any given social domain, but cannot be a substitute for them. For this
reason the conceptual map of civil society is primarily a tool for social heuristics,
which allows the analysis and evaluation of specific programmes and policies. On
the other hand, the very configuration of connections within a given context
provides guidance for institutional and organizational architectures that would allow
effective use of the opportunities generated by the criss-crossing of intended and
unintended outcomes.
A theory of civil society built on the above premises is a necessary prerequisite
for the formulation of policy proposals adequate to the latter objective. Civil society
is at the same time a space of realized forms of social congruence and a conceptual
5 Oikeiosis denotes the appropriation of what is necessary to life under given conditions. In the words of
Cicero’s De finibus, it is a disposition that may be described as ‘‘ipsum sibi conciliari et commendari ad
se conservandum et ad suum statum’’ [to be conciled with oneself and to make oneself apt to the
maintenance of oneself and of one’s own condition] (Cicero, De finibus, III 5, 16; Cicero 2001, p. 105).
6 This feature is emphasized by Edward Shils: ‘‘[a] civil society is a society of civility in the conduct of
the members of the society towards each other. Civility enters into conduct between individuals and
between individuals and the state; it regulates the conduct of individuals towards society. It likewise
regulates the relations of collectivities towards each other, the relations between collectivities and the
state and the relations of individuals within the state’’ (Shils 1991, p. 4).
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map for social heuristics aimed at recognizing social arrangements associated with
partially overlapping connections among individuals or groups. It is also a privileged
route to understanding the political and economic implications of multiple levels of
collective action and governance.
The implications of the above point of view are far-reaching. In particular, the
structure of governance within society at large appears to be not fundamentally
different from governance within smaller groups, and to a certain extent not
essentially different from the conditions governing the arrangement of actions of
individual agents. Indeed, multiple levels of social interaction introduce an
expansive element that paradoxically reduces the distance between different
domains, facilitates connectivity across those domains, and might allow the
implementation of governance by means of mutual adjustment and compensation.
The above framework entails the view that governance cannot be detached from
the possibilities that multiple connectivity allows, and from the constraints that that
very connectivity introduces. The paradigm of civil society calls attention to the
existence under most historical conditions of groups of people organized according
to a multiplicity of criss-crossing patterns of connectivity. Conflict is simmering and
sometimes explicit, but the moderating action of connections on manifold
dimensions is also acknowledged. In short, shifting the focus away from markets
and states towards civil societies brings politics back to centre stage and establishes
it firmly on the self-organized connectivity of social bonds. Civil society is
compatible with a variety of institutional and organizational arrangements (see
above). For this reason, the analysis of civil society cannot be undertaken purely
through deduction from first principles. On the other hand, to undertake such
analysis we need to compare and contrast different contexts, so that recognition of
general characteristics is essential. For this reason, it is practical to concentrate on a
few stylised cases in order to highlight some general features of the whole domain.
The political paradigm of civil society has its roots in the analysis of inter-
subjective relationships among individuals or groups belonging to a reference
domain defined by social closure. In its classical formulation, closure is associated
with membership of the same political community of equals, and isonomy (equality
before the law) is its most distinctive feature. The binary relationship of citizenship is
the prototype of sociability and makes the political model a combination of structural
equivalence (among individual members) and closure to aliens.7 It is to be noted that
the transitivity of citizenship does not exclude the existence of non-transitive
relationships of a more circumscribed type. In other words, the joint membership of
the social domain does not coincide with the citizenship relationship. For this reason,
members of the same political domain may be related with one another on manifold
levels, but systematic relationships with aliens are excluded.
7 J.L. Cohen and A. Arato note the relationship between the political model of civil society and a specific
approach to sociability: ‘‘Politike koinonia was defined as a public ethical–political community of free
and equal citizens under a legally defined system or rule. Law itself, however, was seen as the expression
of an ethos, a common set of norms and values, defining not only political procedures but also a
substantive form of life based on a developed catalogue of preferred virtues and forms of interaction’’
(Cohen and Arato 1992, p. 84). On the different conception underpinning the modern State, see Matteucci
(1993).
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At the same time, it is worth noting that a political association presupposing
social closure may be compatible with a considerable degree of differentiation as to
the relationships between its component individuals and groups. For example, ‘‘the
feudal order of fragmented sovereign units, patrimonial rulers, corporate bodies,
towns, etc., as well as medieval kingship and empire, all came to be described in
different sources as societas civilis sive res publica […]. Unnoticed, this usage
introduced a level of pluralization into the concept that could now hardly be unified
under the idea of an organized collective body, the notion of respublica Christiana
notwithstanding’’ (Cohen and Arato 1992, p. 85). In the latter case, closure under
the citizenship relationship is compatible with a variety of alternative, and
sometimes mutually exclusive, memberships within the polity under consideration.
It may also be compatible with non-political connections, or political connections of
a different type, across domains identified by alternative citizenship relationships.
The economic paradigm of civil society is strikingly different. Its most
distinctive feature is that it is based on social openness rather than social closure,
and its roots are to be found in the mutual congruence of human tasks assigned to
the performance of coordinated, or at least mutually compatible, activities in the
domains of production and exchange. What we are dealing with in this case is a
mode of sociability in which individuals or groups are connected with each other in
virtue of the material content of their activities rather than in terms of a general
criterion of membership, and also independently of any explicit ex ante
co-ordination in view of a deliberate objective. What needs to be emphasized here
is that, as Adam Smith noted, the universal disposition or ‘‘natural propensity to
truck, barter and exchange’’ (Smith, Wealth of Nations, I, ii, 1) is itself a
consequence of ‘‘the general propensity to discursiveness’’ (Rothschild and Sen
2006, p. 322; cf. Rothschild 2001) found in human societies.8 This establishes both
division of labour and commercial exchange on a condition of sociability in which
the attainment of intended outcomes resulting from goal-seeking depends to a large
extent on unintended outcomes resulting from discursive practices.
The binary relationships to be found in productive co-operation (simple or
complex) and in exchange co-ordination are the prototype of sociability under the
economic model of civil society and make this model a combination of structural
equivalence and social openness. Both conditions derive from the primary role
assigned to material congruence (that is, congruence of human dispositions and
actions independently of human decisions), so that formal membership conditions
only take a secondary and subordinate role. A most important consequence of social
openness is the collapse of transitivity. The existence of non-transitive relationships
is the rule and becomes the opening device allowing subjects and groups to move
beyond the confines of a closed relational domain. It is to be noted that in this case
‘local’ relationships become the norm insofar as they are not circumscribed to the
social arrangements compatible with membership of a given political domain, but
may reach (at least in principle) distant subjects and groups.
8 Far from viewing discursiveness as absolutely foundational of all social behaviour, it can be understood
as an irreducible part of a thick social texture that includes other, non-discursive forms of human
interaction.
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The proximity paradigm combines elements of the political and economic
paradigms and points to features of sociability that are central to the identification of
the fundamental relational structure of civil society. This is because in the proximity
paradigm social closure is avoided and congruence among individuals or groups is
achieved through a multiplicity of partially overlapping connections. This is to say
that a civil society grounded in proximity presupposes the existence of a binary
relation open to actual or potential constituent members that is in turn derived from
a collection of relations that are binary only in a circumscribed and local sense. For
example, a civil society of the proximity type can derive from the combination of
economic and political features, so that seemingly disconnected domains are
covered by a single encompassing relationship.
The building blocks of the proximity paradigm are relationships that are
inherently non-transitive (as in the economic model), whereas the general
relationship built upon them is transitive (as in the political paradigm). A
distinctive feature of the proximity paradigm is that individuals or groups derive
their identity from a variety of attributes. Some of those attributes are central in a
given relational domain but secondary in another domain. This lack of a constant
hierarchy of attributes is central to the possibility of a civil society of the proximity
type. For individuals or groups for whom certain attributes are secondary may find
precisely those attributes sufficient to establish a general pattern of congruence with
respect to individuals or groups for whom those attributes are primary. What is
important in this case is the existence of a congruence class including all subjects
sharing a common attribute (which can be primary to certain subjects and secondary
to others, or even secondary to all). The structure of proximity that is hereby
generated allows selective closure of local domains but is open to congruence across
those domains.
Arguably, common citizenship can introduce a binary relationship between two
subjects within the political domain while excluding a third subject from that
relationship, whereas involvement in a common pattern of productive cooperation
(such as division of labour) introduces a binary relationship between the second and
third subjects within the economic domain while excluding the first subject from
that relationship. In that case, a further attribute common to all (such as a common
language or other social practices, customs and traditions) may restore a pattern of
congruence that would otherwise be neglected or jeopardized. It is to be noted that
in this case social congruence may be ridden with conflict among different sub-
domains and yet be open to conflict solution and even co-operation precisely
because conflict is circumscribed to its proper sphere and the possibility of an
encompassing relationship is highlighted.
To sum up, the domain of civil society is grounded in dispositions making
sociability independent of explicit goal-seeking and may take a variety of
configurations depending on which particular disposition (or set of dispositions) is
emphasized. From this point of view, the theory of civil society primarily serves a
heuristic function. This is because it brings to light (1) the alternative criteria of
congruence that may be associated with different dispositions; and (2) the
combination of intended and unintended outcomes that are specific to any given
social domain. In this way, the theory of civil society provides a conceptual
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framework allowing both the analytical reconstruction of existing structures of social
connectivity and the assessment of which institutional and organizational arrange-
ments are congruent with those structures. In particular, this theory suggests patterns
of congruence that are attuned to existing dispositions and yet unrealized in terms of
actual institutions and organizations.
4 Political economies of civil society
The theory of civil society suggests an approach to the economy and its governance
that stand in fundamental opposition to the institutional and organizational structure
of a command economy or of a ‘disembedded’ market order. On the other hand, the
paradigms of civil society discussed above are associated with institutional and
organizational patterns of division of labour and exchange that are fundamentally
different from one another. They are thus associated with alternative political
economies.9
This is primarily because the political economy of civil society is bound to reject
all social configurations that are solely grafted on hierarchies of explicit control and
command in the production and allocation of goods and services. In fact, emphasis
on unintended causal processes and unintended outcomes highlights ‘lateral’ (and
often non-hierarchical) connections among individuals or groups that are incom-
patible with persistently star-shaped configurations of social and economic
connections. Temporary asymmetries between individuals or groups are possible,
but they are not necessarily associated with ascriptive positions in the social
structure. Nor do they necessarily lead to obstacles in the dynamic reshuffling of
social and economic positions. Individuals or groups have different kinds of access
to goods and services, but these differences often are inherently unstable and do not
lead to persistent inequality and exclusion. In particular, the different paradigms of
civil society discussed above lead to alternative economic structures and suggest
that civil society is compatible with manifold social architectures. In short, the
intertwining of intended and unintended outcomes in a civil society calls attention to
a range of different political economies, which may be feasible in different historical
contexts.
This section discusses the political economies that are associated with the three
paradigms of civil society outlined in the previous section. First, the political
paradigm of civil society (as defined above) entails the organization of production
and exchange according to the criterion of division of labour among members of the
political unit under consideration (be it the Greek polis or the modern state). This
9 Any given political economy presupposes the design of a specific organizational structure, insofar as it
requires the arrangement of human actions in view of a particular objective, or set of objectives. Max
Weber’s distinction between organization and union is useful in clarifying this concept: ‘‘[a]n
’organization’ (Betrieb) is a system of continuous purposive activity of a specified kind’’ whereas the
association (Verein) is ‘‘a corporate group originating in a voluntary agreement and in which the
established order claims authority over the members only by virtue of a personal act of adherence’’
(Weber 1947, p. 28). In view of Max Weber’s discussion, a political economy consistent with the non-
instrumental character of civil society would be a specific organization (Betrieb) embedded in a wider
space of social connections (Verein). (See, on this issue, Oakeshott 1975 and Ornaghi 1990, p. 25).
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means that the formal pattern of division of labour would normally exclude non-
citizens and will be strictly associated with membership in the political association
(as it is shown by the role of trade guilds in the governance of the late medieval city
state).10 Under these conditions, exchange within the city state or the nation state
(internal exchange) is primarily a scheme of interdependence reflecting the pattern
of specialization between workers or workers’ groups who are also members of the
same body politic, and will be politically regulated under the assumption of social
closure. External exchange follows different criteria but in this case too the role of
central governance is decisive.
Second, the economic paradigm of civil society (as defined above) follows a
seemingly opposite track. What this model highlights is the possibility of a political
economy grounded in the primacy of interdependencies between production or
exchange activities independently of the dividing lines between political associa-
tions (such as city states or nation states). Therefore, the advantages from the
specialization of production processes, as well as those associated with the
transferring of goods and services from one set of agents to another, accrue
independently of any membership criterion associated with social closure under
political association. However, this does not exclude closure under other criteria.
For example, an open structure of sociability grounded in division of labour and
trade (and generally associated with division of labour through trade) presupposes
the existence of technical standards, monetary arrangements, and legal criteria
recognized and enforceable across different fields of political sovereignty (the late
medieval, modern and contemporary lex mercatoria being a case in point). In short,
the economic paradigm of civil society substitutes openness for closure only within
a circumscribed domain of social interaction: the political economy associated with
it is open through trade and division of labour but makes openness conditional upon
the willingness and ability to follow the universal standards and norms that ensure
the compatibility of decisions and actions across different political domains.11
10 Anthony Black notes in this connection that ‘‘a distinctive and clearly defined notion of community
developed during the take-off period of the urban movement, and was applied indifferently to towns of all
sizes, to villages and to guilds. Popular and official opinion in towns appears to have regarded such a
community as by its very existence having a moral right to corporate status, to juridical personality, to the
ownership of collective property, and also a moral right to elect its own rulers and govern its internal
affairs. This was part of the secret behind the rapid spread of the word universitates to describe such
groups’’ (Black 1984, p. 45). Indeed, ‘‘in German cities, and in Italian cities which escaped despotism, the
council remained the centre of government, to which later on craft guilds clamoured for admission’’
(Black 1984, p. 48). In due course a ‘‘politicization of guild values’’ took place: ‘‘[a guild] was no longer
‘‘brotherhood’’ in the sense of a commitment to specific persons […] but rather a readiness to be friendly
to others just because they are one’s fellow citizens. It was a social relationship under the rule of law’’
(Black 1984, p. 77). The priority of closed political membership over relatively open guild membership
was not true for all medieval city states, as some viewed participation in guilds and other intermediary
institutions as more primary than formal membership in political and legal structures. (see Black 1984;
Gierke 1900, especially pp. 1–100; Gierke 1973, especially pp. 143–160; Maitland 2003; Bo¨ckenfo¨rde
1982; Goldschmidt and Wohlgemuth 2008).
11 For this reason the economic model of civil society points to the possibility of a civil society whose
structure is in principle independent of the division lines between political associations and domains of
political sovereignty. However, international civil society need not be exclusively dependent on the
specific type of sociability associated with this model (see Porta and Scazzieri 1997, particularly
pp. 17–20; see also Scazzieri 2003b).
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Third, the proximity paradigm involves political economies that are fundamen-
tally different from those associated with the other two paradigms. The grounding of
the proximity paradigm in partial similarity through secondary features (as outlined
in Sect. 3) suggests a number of important implications as to the institutional and
organizational arrangement of economic activities. In particular, any given structure
of proximity suggests that congruence is achieved through the partial overlap of
manifold attributes: cleavages are admitted but they are cross-cutting rather than
coinciding. A proximity structure is not built upon a single binary relation within the
social domain: it is rather associated with a variety of ‘local’ binary structures that
are nonetheless intertwined, so that no individual or group is fully excluded or
entirely hegemonic. At the same time, no individual or group may reasonably claim
to be connected with everybody else to the same degree. A civil society of the
proximity type is a relatively loose yet ultimately cohesive structure of connections,
such that missing links of one type are ‘made up’ by links of a different type. For
example, formal membership in the political association may be limited to a narrow
subset of individuals or groups yet economic or cultural connections may be
sufficient to bring about a much more inclusive domain of connectivity.
The proximity paradigms suggests far-reaching implications for political economy.
For example, the inability to meet certain formal prerequisites of a particular contract
may be compensated by the guarantees associated with the inclusion of that contract
within a more comprehensive set of interpersonal arrangements. Certain instances of
pre-modern, modern and contemporary credit agreements are a case in point. For
example, peasant credit in the medieval village economy was often horizontal in the
sense of presupposing only the non-simultaneous distribution of provisions and needs
across different peasant units: one peasant family would be in a condition of deficit
when another peasant family would be in a condition of surplus (or vice versa). In this
case, proximity is realized by means of the multiple connections among units within
the same village economy and this proximity by density was the ultimate guarantor of
creditworthiness (see Briggs 2008 and 2009). In other cases, proximity would act
across different places and communities precisely by virtue of the uniqueness of ties
linking otherwise nonadjacent individuals or groups. Here, exceptional conditions of
partial similarity could trigger proximity by distance and generate social congruence
across seemingly unbridgeable dividing lines between places, interests, and cultures
(see Andreoni and Scazzieri 2011). There are both past and present examples of this
phenomenon. For instance, knowledge of a common language (Arabic) allowed
twelfth-century Maghribi traders to exchange goods and establish marriage ties with
traders in Malabar in spite of the huge expanse between them (see Goitein 1967, vol. I,
pp. 167, 169).12 Another example is contemporary global commerce, which allows
cities and regions to trade with each other across the world and in this process to
discover patterns of connectivity that go beyond contracts or rights (Sassen 2001). In
spite of their utilization of seemingly opposite connecting devices, both proximity by
density and proximity by distance make use of the same fundamental criterion: the
possibility of introducing partially overlapping connections within a given social
12 See also Chaudhuri 1985 and de la Vaissie`re 2004 for alternative paths to proximity by distance across
trade routes respectively in the Indian Ocean and along the Silk Road.
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space. This possibility allows both multiple and mutually reinforcing connections
within a closed group of people, and connections by which agents within that group
may compensate lack of local opportunities with opportunities associated with
external contacts and ties. Relationships of production and exchange properly
configured under the proximity assumption are inherently expansive and mutually
reinforcing, independently of whether they follow proximity by density or proximity
by distance. In either case, partial overlaps allow mutual adjustments to an extent that
would be impossible in either the political or the economic paradigm of civil society.
Universal standards are no longer required insofar as individuals and groups are able to
interact in manifold ways, either by exploring the richness (density) of local
relationships, or by detecting the opportunities associated with unknown situations
and contexts. The political economy of proximity highlights the opportunities due to
partial overlaps and cross-cutting cleavages. It is primarily a type of social structure in
which economic arrangements are not sharply separate from other arrangements, so
that losses in one domain may be compensated by gains in other domains.
To conclude, individuals or groups are not uniquely arranged along a single
dimension of dominance/subordination even in the absence of an abstract and
formal standard of ‘isonomy’ (equality before the law). It is also important to realize
that a political economy based upon the proximity paradigm of civil society may
take very different configurations depending on whether proximity by density or
proximity by distance is followed. In the former case, economic activities are
embedded in a thick network of local relationships, such as those of a medieval
village economy (Briggs 2008, 2009) or of an early modern neighbourhood
economy (Muldrew 1996). In the latter case (proximity by distance), economic
activities are embedded in a loose (but nonetheless effective) network of non-local
relationships and ties, such as those associated with long-distance global commerce
(Sassen 2001). In either case, a political economy of the proximity type embeds
production and exchange in a social structure characterized by open-ended
connectivity and multiple dimensions of interaction. Here, patterns of division of
labour and market arrangements take shape within a domain that avoids both the
social closure of political associations and the selective openness of purely
economic relationships. This brings about political economies that are at the same
time resilient in overall connectivity but also remarkably flexible concerning the
specific arrangement of social connections at any given time.
By contrast with the political and the economic paradigm of civil society, the
proximity paradigm blends openness with specificity. Through a focus on multiple
kinds of connectivity, this model is conducive to social congruence through
interdependence across different domains. At the same time, it particularizes the
actors who are bound together not exclusively by formal rights or contracts by instead
also—and perhaps primarily—by ties of social practices, customs and traditions.
5 Implications for principles of economic policy
The theory of civil society outlined in the previous sections suggests a number of
guiding policy principles, even if those principles cannot be reduced to simple
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recipes and straightforward advice. Indeed we would be dealing with principles
having certain features of a heuristics, insofar as they would presuppose a prior
identification of context and possibilities. Those principles are briefly discussed
below before turning to the specific case of credit policy:
1. The configuration of unintended outcomes relevant to any given context should
be recognized. This would often involve identification of which paradigm of
civil society would be most appropriate to the social context in view.
Sometimes multiple paradigms are feasible. In this case, a specific paradigm
should be selected as the policy benchmark to be followed.
2. After selecting a particular paradigm of civil society as the relevant policy
benchmark, it would be important to identify a set of middle principles of the
instrumental type. These principles would allow recognition both of interme-
diate objectives to be pursued and of practical means to achieve those
objectives.13
3. Both the intermediate objectives and the practical realizations of those
objectives should be assessed in terms of the selected paradigm of civil
society. This means that any given policy result should be evaluated in terms of
two criteria: first, whether or not (or to what extent) the intermediate objective
has been realized; second, whether or not the realized objective (or its degree of
realization) are consistent with the given benchmark. For example, a policy
aimed at the reduction of unemployment may be relatively successful. At the
same time, that policy might be inconsistent with some fundamental prereq-
uisites of civil society of the political type: unemployment reduction may
violate fundamental principles of human dignity by allowing slave work, forced
labour and exploitative labour contracts such as remuneration below the ‘living
wage’ (Ryan 2007).
In short, the policy framework of civil society has to be seen primarily in terms of
a hierarchy of principles, whereby the sociability condition resulting from the
working out of unintended outcomes is made compatible with a plurality of
realizations of the means-end type. Any given realization should be associated with
a particular set of policy instruments in view of a given set of intermediate
objectives. In terms of the analytical framework of this paper, the latter objectives
would coincide with a particular political economy.
Formally, we may take a certain set of unintended outcomes as the benchmark in
terms of which to assess intermediate objectives and more practical means.
Alternative political economies may be considered as intermediate objectives in
view of that social condition. Finally, we may be able to identify a set of variables
whose values are positively related to the satisfactory working of any given political
economy. In this case, it may be useful to introduce a further differentiation in the
set of unintended outcomes between target variables and instrumental variables.
This means that a conventionally defined set of values would be assigned to a
13 The implications of this approach for the organization of civil society in a political economy of the
market type have been investigated by Luigi Einaudi (1949, especially pp. 39–56) and Wilhelm Ro¨pke
(1944, especially pp. 1–49).
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certain number of variables (for example, a given level of employment will be
selected as compatible with the assumed configuration of the political economy).
Finally, a maximizing or satisficing procedure14 may be followed in order to
identify the values for the remaining policy instruments.15 What is noteworthy in the
above procedure is its sequential character and the distinction, at any given step,
between instruments and objectives. This allows the introduction of a hierarchical
principle in the assignment and realization of policy objectives, which is in turn
consistent with the assessment of realizations at any single step of the analytical
exercise.
To assess the policy principles of civil society, it is necessary to introduce a
separation criterion. According to that criterion, at any given layer of the existing
socio-economic set-up we may distinguish final objectives from intermediate
objectives, and the latter from the practical means to achieve them.16 At a
fundamental stage of investigation, a certain configuration of intended and
unintended outcomes (and thus a certain condition of sociability) must be identified.
This condition of sociability would correspond to a particular paradigm of civil
society. A specific political economy (that is, a specific set of means-ends
relationships) should then be identified, which would be compatible with the
paradigm of civil society under consideration. In short, separation principles are
essential to assessing whether the policies aimed at the realization of intermediate
objectives are compatible with the assumed condition of sociability. They are also
essential to assessing whether the assumed condition of sociability helps attain those
intermediate objectives.
The above arguments have manifold implications in a variety of economic policy
fields. Credit policy is a case in point. The theory of civil society suggests that
enforcement of contracts (and thus also the settling of debt-credit relationships)
relies upon the self-fulfilled strength of successfully met obligations rather than
upon the threat of sanctions. However, different paradigms of civil society would
suggest different solutions to this general issue. The political economy of a city state
or nation state would generally encourage mutual agreements based upon the
relationship of citizenship. This implies trustworthiness associated with common
membership in a local or national polity and credit facilities primarily available to
members of that polity. On the other hand, the political economy of a commercial
14 In Herbert Simon’s view a ‘satisficing’ point of view is one whereby ‘‘we look for good enough
solutions rather than insisting that only the best solutions will do’’ (Simon 1983, p. 85).
15 We are indebted for this formal argument to the treatment by Silva Marzetti Dall’Aste Brandolini
(2011, pp. 318–20), in which she refers to the pioneering work by Jan Tinbergen in that connection
(Tinbergen 1952).
16 Luigi Pasinetti’s ‘separation theorem’ provides the analytical foundation for the above procedure.
According to Pasinetti, it is always possible to distinguish, in any given economic system, fundamental
structural properties independent of behavioural and institutional contexts, and more local properties that
only hold true for specific sets of behavioural and institutional conditions. In his own words, the
separation theorem ‘‘states that we must make it possible to disengage those investigations that concern
the foundational bases of economic relations—to be detected at a strictly essential level of basic
economic analysis—from those investigations that must be carried out at the level of the actual economic
institutions, which at any time any economic system is landed with, or has chosen to adopt, or is trying to
achieve’’ (Pasinetti 2007, p. 275).
The political economy of civil society
123
Author's personal copy
society encourages credit contracts associated with impersonal trustworthiness
among individuals or groups that could be otherwise unrelated to one another. In
this case, credit is normally available independently of any condition of social
closure (such as common membership in a polity). It critically depends on whether
impersonal standards of creditworthiness are met. Finally, in a political economy of
the proximity type credit may be available subject to membership of local networks
and groups that can be circumscribed without being exclusive. In this case,
trustworthiness and creditworthiness do not presuppose any common membership
or standard, but make credit available across different and partially overlapping
social domains. Creditworthiness would be generated by the existence of multiple
linkages making people mutually trustworthy on one particular dimension as a
consequence of their trustworthiness on other dimensions.
This makes the proximity model a useful heuristic for the identification of credit
arrangements and credit policies that may be effective in relational contexts where
the above structure of congruence is relevant. The proximity heuristic calls attention
to the embedding that social connectivity can provide for credit arrangements when
borrowers and lenders are mutually dependent in social domains different from
those in which loans are being made. Loans to consumption and loans to production
are alternative routes along which social connectivity may act as collateral of debt-
credit arrangements. In loans to consumption, differences among the time profiles of
different agents’ consumption needs are essential in determining the configuration
of complementarity among those agents. In this case, different time profiles work as
reciprocal collateral for loans. Interlocking needs point to the possibility of lending
and borrowing ‘across’ different time profiles due to the intertemporal comple-
mentarity of agents’ needs. Lending of this type does not require any abstinence
from consumption, nor does it require any material ‘giving back’ of what has been
borrowed. The complementarity of needs between, say, time periods t and t’ makes
restitution arrangements redundant insofar as agents at time t are confident that they
will be part of the same credit structure over the time horizon encompassing both
t and t’. The situation becomes different when the complementarity over time breaks
down. For example, two agents may need the same commodity at the same time, so
that an allocation conflict may arise. If there is such a conflict, we are back to the
conventional scenario of abstinence from consumption in view of future compen-
sation (interest), and a trade arrangement within the single period (such as a loan
contract) may be necessary to avoid that agents be locked in struggle.
In the case of credit policy, the proximity heuristic brings into focus the structure of
congruence within a given social setting and underscores the argument that effective
credit policies cannot be derived from a standardised set of benchmarks applied
without consideration of context. By contrast with most approaches to credit policy
that rely largely on the creditworthiness of current and projected assets and income
(lending from private institutions or public bodies), the proximity paradigm shows
that functioning credit arrangements have to be context-specific in order to make use
of the most appropriate set of collaterals. The implications of the above argument are
significant. The proximity framework emphasizes that different consumption-need
profiles may provide opportunities for co-ordination over time that are independent of
trading current consumption against future promise in the single period. Persistence of
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the proximity structure allowing the intertemporal co-ordination of agents is sufficient
to make credit arrangements possible in the absence of formal lending and borrowing
within the single period.
The same argument applies to lending and borrowing in the production sphere.
Here, the differences among the time profiles of inputs’ utilization for different
production processes determine a set of possible complementarities among
individual producers and/or productive sectors. In this case, different time profiles
of the input absorptions that production processes require from each other may work
as reciprocal collateral for loans among producers. The proximity heuristic allows
the identification of production complementarities over time that may be conducive
to co-ordination among production processes without formal trade arrangements
among them. As in the loans-to-consumption case, complementarity over time
breaks down if multiple processes require the same (produced) inputs from other
processes at the same time. In this case too, formal trade arrangements may be
needed in order to settle potentially conflicting claims for a given input provision.
To sum up, the proximity heuristic provides a threefold tool for credit policy: first of
all, it allows the distinction between different opportunities of loans-to-consumption
or loans-to-production; second, it highlights the dependence of collateral provision
on specific complementarities among consumption or production requirements;
third, it emphasizes the context-dependence of effective credit policies.
6 Concluding remarks
The purpose of this paper has been to ground the concept of civil society in an
account of sociability that views multiple patterns of connectivity as more primary
than formal contracts or rights associated with markets and states. This conception
of sociability emphasizes the self-enforcing configuration of intended and
unintended outcomes that derives from social connectivity and determines the
actual direction and intensity of the causal processes initiated by agents’ actions. In
this perspective, the domain of civil society rests upon the existence of social
connections that embed economic and political processes.
The conceptual framework outlined in this paper has far-reaching consequences
for the understanding of the economy and the polity, and of their relationships. First,
civil society is neither defined nor determined by markets and states but on the
contrary encompasses both. Markets and states are seen as embedded in civil
society, so that the outcomes of immediate means-end actions are subordinate to
causal structures rooted in a more encompassing condition of sociability. In
particular, those causal structures are grounded in the criss-crossing pattern of
intended and unintended outcomes. A notable consequence is that any given agent
may often miss his (her) own specific target, even if actions of that agent may be
effective in achieving other agents’ goals, or different goals of the same agent. As a
result, explaining the outcomes of market or political interaction may seldom be
effective unless an effort is made at identifying the causal structure governing the
interdependence between intended and unintended outcomes under given condi-
tions. Second, the primacy of social connectivity entails that economic and political
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institutions cannot be judged solely on their own terms but are to be seen against a
benchmark that is more comprehensive than any specific set of economic and
political arrangements, an argument that is highlighted by the proximity paradigm.
Third, civil society is compatible with a range of different political economies. In
particular, the theory developed in this paper suggests that the proximity paradigm
of civil society is conducive to the discovery of political economies that foster
greater openness and specificity compared with the political and the economic
paradigm. Fourth, our conception of the political economies of civil society has
implications for economic policy principles. We have argued that a hierarchy of
such principles is necessary in order not to loose track of the priority of social
connectivity over immediate means-end relationships, while at the same time
ensuring a plurality of arrangements and a multiplicity of policy options.
The aim of this paper is not to provide specific policy recommendations.
However, the paper does argue that the theory of civil society in general and the
proximity paradigm in particular are indispensable heuristic tools to identity the
unrealized capacities inherent in any given social configuration. The causal structure
of civil society gives priority to arrangements that combine openness across
different social domains with the specificity of goal-seeking strategies, thus
emphasizing the need to address forms of participation and intervention beyond
formal membership. We have argued that only policies compatible with that
framework can help attain the potential offered by patterns of social connectivity
that bind together instrumental with non-instrumental modes of interaction within
the existing texture of intended and unintended outcomes.
References
Andreoni, A., & Scazzieri, R. (2011). Towards a structural theory of credit. Cambridge: Clare Hall,
Mimeo.
Arrow, K. J. (1951). An extension of the basic theorems of classical welfare economics. In Proceedings of
the second Berkeley symposium on mathematical statistics and probability (pp. 507–532). Berkeley
& Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Black, A. (1984). Guilds and civil society in European political thought from the twelfth century to the
present. London: Methuen.
Bo¨ckenfo¨rde, E.-W. (1982). Staat, Gesellschaft, Kirche. Freiburg: Herder.
Briggs, C. (2008). The availability of credit in the English countryside, 1400–1480. Agricultural History
Review, 56, 1–24.
Briggs, C. (2009). Credit and village society in fourteenth century England. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Broome, J. (2009). Motivation. Theoria, 75, 79–99.
Carlyle, T. (1843). Past and Present. London: Chapman & Hall Ltd.
Cartwright, N. (2007). Hunting causes and using them. Approaches in philosophy and economics.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chaudhuri, K. N. (1985). Trade and civilisation in the Indian Ocean: An economic history from the rise of
Islam to 1750. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chipman, J. (2002). The fundamental theorems of welfare economics. University of Minnesota,
unpublished manuscript.
Cicero, M. T. (2001). On moral ends (J. Annas, Ed., R. Woolf, Trans.). Cambridge and New York:
Cambridge University Press.
A. Pabst, R. Scazzieri
123
Author's personal copy
Cohen, J. L., & Arato, A. (1992). Civil society and political theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Cudworth, R. (1996; 1st ed. 1731). A treatise concerning eternal and immutable morality. In H. Sarah
(Ed.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
de la Vaissie`re, E. (2004). Histoire des marchands sogdiens (2nd ed.). Paris: Institut des Hautes Etudes
Chinoises.
Drolet, A., & Suppes, P. (2008). The good and the bad, the true and the false. In M. C. Galavotti, R.
Scazzieri, & P. Suppes (Eds.), Reasoning, rationality and probability (pp. 13–35). Stanford, CA:
CSLI Publications.
Einaudi, L. (1949). Lezioni di politica sociale. Torino: Giulio Einaudi Editore.
Ferguson, A. (1966 [1767]). An essay on the history of civil society. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press.
Gierke, O. (1900). Political theories of the middle ages (F. W. Maitland, trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Gierke, O. (1973). Associations and the law: The classical and early christian stages (G. Heinrich, trans.).
Toronto: Toronto University Press.
Goitein, S. D. (1967). A mediterranean society. The Jewish communities of the Arab world as portrayed
in the documents of the Cairo Geniza, vol. I: Economic foundations. Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press.
Goldschmidt, N., & Wohlgemuth, M. (2008). Social market economy: Origins, meanings and
interpretations. Constitutional Political Economy, 19, 261–276.
Granovetter, M. (1973). The strength of weak ties. The American Journal of Sociology, 78, 1360–1380.
Granovetter, M. (2005). The impact of social structure on economic outcomes. Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 19, 33–50.
Hayek, F. A. (1969). Rechtsordnung und Handelnsordnung. In F. A. Hayek (Ed.), Freiburger Studien
(pp. 161–198). Tu¨bingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
Hayek, F. A. (1973). Law, legislation and liberty, vol. I: Rules and order. London and Henley: Routledge
and Kegan Paul.
Hayek, F. A. (1978). The Errors of Constructivism. In F. A. Hayek. New studies in philosophy, politics,
economics and the history of ideas (pp. 3–22). London and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
(Originally an inaugural lecture delivered at the Paris-Lodron University of Salzburg, 1970).
Hirschman, A. (1982). Shifting involvements: Private interest and public action. Oxford: Robertson.
Hirschman, A. (1985). Against parsimony. Economics and Philosophy, 1, 7–21.
Hume, D. (1948). Dialogues concerning natural religion. New York: Hafner.
Maitland, F. W. (2003). State, trust and corporation. In D. Runciman & M. Ryan (Eds.). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Marzetti Dall’Aste Brandolini, S. (2011). Moral good and right conduct: A general theory of welfare
under fundamental uncertainty. In S. Marzetti Dall’Aste Brandolini & R. Scazzieri (Eds.),
Fundamental uncertainty. Rationality and plausible reasoning (pp. 294–330). Basingstoke and New
York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Matteucci, N. (1993). Lo stato moderno. Lessico e percorsi. Bologna: Il Mulino.
Menger, C. (1963 [1883]). Problems of economics and sociology, Urbana: University of Illinois Press
(German original: Untersuchungen u¨ber die Methode der Sozialwissenschaften und der Politischen
Oekonomie insbesondere, Leipzig: Duncker and Humblot).
Muldrew, C. (1996). The culture of reconciliation: Community and the settlement of economic disputes in
early modern England. Historical Journal, 39(4), 915–942.
Oakeshott, M. (1975). On human conduct. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ornaghi, L. (1990). Economic structure and political institutions: A theoretical framework.
In M. Baranzini & R. Scazzieri (Eds.), The economic theory of structure and change (pp.
23–44). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pasinetti, L. L. (2007). Keynes and the Cambridge Keynesians. A ‘revolution in economics’ to be
accomplished. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Polanyi, K. (2000; 1st ed. 1944). The great transformation: The political and economic origins of our
time. Boston: Beacon Press.
Porta, P. L., & Scazzieri, R. (1997). Towards an economic theory of international civil society: Trust,
trade and open government. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 8, 5–28.
Powell, W. W. (1990). Neither market nor hierarchy: Network forms of organization. Research in
organizational behavior, 12, 295–336.
Rothschild, E. (1994). Adam Smith and the invisible hand. The American Economic Review, 84, 319–322.
The political economy of civil society
123
Author's personal copy
Rothschild, E. (2001). Economic sentiments. Adam Smith, Condorcet, and the Enlightenment. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Rothschild, E., & Sen, A. (2006). Adam Smith’s economics. In K. Haakonssen (Ed.), The Cambridge
companion to Adam Smith (pp. 319–365). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ryan, J. A. (2007; 1906). A living wage, reprint. Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publishing.
Sassen, S. (2001). Global cities and global city-regions: A comparison. In A. J. Scott (Ed.), Global city-
regions. Trends, theory, policy (pp. 78–95). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Scazzieri, R. (2003a). A theory of framing and coordination: Hayek and the scottish tradition. Rivista
internazionale di scienze economiche e commerciali, 50, 323–349.
Scazzieri, R. (2003b). Teorı´a econo´mica de la sociedad civil global. In J. V. Beneyto (Ed.), Hacia una
socieded civil global (pp. 119–138). Madrid: Taurus.
Scazzieri, R., & Zamagni, S. (2008). Between theory and history: On the identity of Hicks’s economics.
In R. Scazzieri, A. Sen, & S. Zamagni (Eds.) Markets, money and capital. Hicksian perspectives for
the twenty-first century (pp. 1–37). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shils, E. (1991). The virtue of civil society. Government and Opposition, 26, 3–20.
Simon, H. (1983). Reason in human affairs. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Smith, A. (1976 [1759]). The theory of moral sentiments, In D. D. Raphael & A. L. Macfie (Eds.). Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Smith, A. (1976 [1776]). An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations. (R. H. Campbell
& A. S. Skinner, General Eds., W. B.Todd, Textual Ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Tinbergen, J. (1952). On the theory of economic policy. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Vanberg, V. J. (2005). Market and state: The perspective of constitutional political economy. Journal of
Institutional Economics, 1, 23–49.
Weber, M. (1947). The theory of social and economic organization. New York: The Free Press of
Glencoe (German original edn. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Tu¨bingen: Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1922).
Wieser, F. (1926). Das Gesetz der Macht. Vienna: J. Springer.
A. Pabst, R. Scazzieri
123
Author's personal copy
